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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

Emotion expressions convey valuable information about others’ internal states and
likely behaviours. Accurately identifying expressions is critical for social interactions,
but so is perceiver confidence when decoding expressions. Even if a perceiver
correctly labels an expression, uncertainty may impair appropriate behavioural
responses and create uncomfortable interactions. Past research has found that
perceivers report greater confidence when identifying emotions displayed by
cultural ingroup members, an effect attributed to greater perceptual skill and
familiarity with own-culture than other-culture faces. However, the current research
presents novel evidence for an ingroup advantage in emotion decoding confidence
across arbitrary group boundaries that hold culture constant. In two experiments
using different stimulus sets participants not only labeled minimal ingroup
expressions more accurately, but did so with greater confidence. These results offer
novel evidence that ingroup advantages in emotion decoding confidence stem
partly from social-cognitive processes.

Received 29 November 2015
Revised 8 December 2016
Accepted 9 December 2016

Expressions of emotion communicate important social
information, including conveying internal mental
states and forecasting likely behaviours. For example,
smiling suggests contentment and benevolent
approach (e.g. Parkinson, 2005). Accurately identifying
emotional displays is critical for coordinating social
interactions. Indeed, dating back to Darwin’s seminal
work (1965), evidence suggests that humans have an
innate ability to both display emotions through
facial movements and to decode others’ expressions
of emotions (see also Hess & Thibault, 2009).
Although emotion identification is accurate across
a wide-range of contexts (Ekman, 1972), some
factors are known to moderate expression recognition
(e.g. Hugenberg, Young, Sacco, & Bernstein, 2011). For
example, there is a reliable cultural ingroup advantage,
such that emotion identification is most accurate
when perceiver and expresser culture align. Elfenbein
and Ambady (2002) proposed that this advantage
arises from slight differences in how emotions are displayed in different cultures (i.e. non-verbal dialects
akin to regional differences in spoken language),
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which interfere with perceivers’ ability to decode
expressions.
This dialect theory is well supported. For example,
native-Japanese and American-Japanese faces
can be accurately differentiated based on their
expressions alone, suggesting the existence of
culture-specific differences in the appearance of
emotions (Marsh, Elfenbein, & Ambady, 2003).
Additionally, the magnitude of the cultural ingroup
advantage is predicted by perceivers’ contact with
cultural outgroup members, indicating that exposure
to other-cultures’ non-verbal dialects improves the
ability to decode outgroup expressions (Elfenbein &
Ambady, 2003).
Most relevant to the current research, the cultural
ingroup advantage extends to other measures of
emotion processing, including confidence, as perceivers report greater certainty when labeling ownculture than other-culture expressions (Beaupré &
Hess, 2006). This is notable, as a lack of confidence
when decoding expressions may delay appropriate
responses and disrupt interpersonal communication
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across group boundaries, even if perceivers do correctly label the expression. With this in mind, the
present research investigates whether an ingroup
advantage in emotion identification confidence
extends to other intergroup boundaries. We report
two experiments that examine whether an ingroup
advantage in emotion identification confidence can
be generated in minimal intergroup contexts that
hold culture constant.

Mere ingroup advantages
There is evidence that social-cognitive factors contribute to ingroup advantages in emotion processing. In
one demonstration, participants identified the
expressions of ostensible basketball teammates
more accurately than competitors, even when their
teammates were from other cultures (Thibault,
Bourgeois, & Hess, 2006). More recently, Young and
Hugenberg (2010) found that lab-created minimal
group distinctions generate an ingroup advantage in
emotion decoding within a single culture, in part
due to participants’ greater motivation to attend to
socially important ingroup faces. These results demonstrate that ingroup advantages in emotion identification exist even when expressive dialects are
controlled.
However, although an ingroup advantage in
emotion identification accuracy can be generated
by creating ingroup/outgroup boundaries in the lab,
it is unclear whether additional cultural ingroup
effects can be similarly recreated. In the current
work, we address whether the ingroup advantage
in emotion identification confidence can be observed
in minimal group contexts. This is a meaningful but
unanswered question. Theoretically, the own-culture
advantage in decoding confidence is attributed to
low familiarity with cultural outgroups’ expressive
dialects (e.g. Beaupré & Hess, 2006). However, if
minimal group distinctions can generate a similar
ingroup confidence advantage when culture is held
constant, this will offer a novel demonstration of
how intergroup boundaries alone can create
ingroup biases in face perception (e.g. Hugenberg
et al., 2011).

Emotion identification confidence in social
interactions
A minimal ingroup advantage in emotion identification confidence also has implications for social
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interactions. If a perceiver correctly recognises furrowed brows and pursed lips as anger but is
unsure of whether this perception is accurate, this
uncertainty may disrupt appropriate behavioural
reactions (e.g. Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005) and
create misunderstandings. Thus, if confidence in
emotion decoding is lower for outgroup than
ingroup expressions, awkward or unpleasant
intergroup interactions may follow (e.g. Gray,
Mendes, & Denny-Brown, 2008), and empathic
responding may be reduced (Marsh, Kozak, &
Ambady, 2007).
All told, for emotion displays to successfully function as a signaling system that coordinates social
behaviour (e.g. Parkinson, 2005), perceivers need to
not only accurately identify expressions, but do so
with confidence. Thus, understanding how even arbitrary group distinctions can lead to an ingroup advantage in emotion decoding confidence is theoretically
and practically valuable. Although feelings of subjective confidence are a critical component of emotion
decoding, this phenomenon has received little attention aside from the Beaupré and Hess’ (2006) investigation of a cultural ingroup advantage in
confidence. The present experiment aims to address
this lacuna in the literature.

The current research
The current research tests whether the ingroup confidence advantage previously observed across cultural groups generalises to minimal group contexts.
This question is theoretically interesting, because a
minimal ingroup confidence advantage could not
be attributed to differential experience with otherculture dialects. To provide a stringent test of this
hypothesis, we utilised a procedure that creates
ingroups and outgroups in the lab while holding
constant culture and other factors that may bias
emotion decoding. Generalisability across stimulus
sets was also established by using different expressive faces in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. In
each study, participants viewed expressive faces of
ostensible ingroup or outgroup members and were
tasked with identifying the emotion being displayed
and recording how confident they were in their
response (see Beaupré & Hess, 2006). Finally, as a
manipulation check, we included self-report
measures of motivation and group identification in
each experiment.

194

S. G. YOUNG AND J. P. WILSON

Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Forty-five participants of European ancestry (31
Female, Mage = 22.4) from a private university in the
Northeastern United States took part in the experiment in exchange for course credit. Sample size was
determined assuming a medium effect size (η 2 = .06;
Murphy, Myors, & Wolach, 2004) and desired power
of .95.

Procedure
Participants were seated in individual workstations
equipped with desktop computers and CRT monitors.
The experimenter verbally informed participants they
would complete a task measuring “personality and
social cognition”. All additional instructions were provided via computer. The experiment used a repeatedmeasures design.
Participants first completed an ostensible personality inventory that served as a minimal group induction
(see Young & Hugenberg, 2010). In the present experiment, participants rated how much they enjoyed ten
colorful images on a 1–7 scale. After a 10-second
delay, the computer informed participants that they
were either a “circle” or “square” personality type.
This personality feedback had actually been randomly
generated and served to assign participants to a newly
created ingroup. To increase the apparent importance
of this personality assessment, participants were
informed that being a circle[square] personality type
has important implications for their professional and
personal lives, and that the test is often used as a personality assessment by psychologists and businesses.
Following the minimal group manipulation, participants were told they would view faces of either their
own personality type (i.e. ingroup members) or of
the other personality type (i.e. outgroup members).
Additional instructions explained that the personality
type of the individuals shown would be indicated by
the shape of backgrounds and text labels for each
face. Which background indicated ingroup or outgroup members was determined by which group participants were randomly assigned to.
The expressive targets were 10 White male faces
taken from the NIMSTIM (Tottenham et al., 2009) database. Participants viewed each face identity displaying
five different emotions: anger, fear, happiness,
sadness, and disgust. The order of images was

randomised. In total, participants completed 50 trials
(25 ingroup; 25 outgroup), with 5 ingroup and outgroup faces expressing each emotion. For each
image viewed, participants were instructed to make
two judgments: (1) identify the emotional expression
and (2) indicate their confidence level. Which faces
were presented as ingroup or outgroup members
was fully counterbalanced, such that all faces were
viewed as both ingroup and outgroup members
depending on counterbalancing condition.
To measure accuracy, we followed a procedure
identical to Young and Hugenberg (2010). A central fixation point was shown for 1000 ms followed by a randomly presented background shape for 1000 ms.
Then, an expressive face appeared for 500 ms before
being replaced by a screen that offered five emotion
labels that corresponded to a number on the keyboard
(e.g. 1 = happy, 2 = angry). Participants answered by
pressing the number that corresponded to the
expression they believed the face had displayed.
Correct responses were summed separately for
ingroup and outgroup targets and by each expression,
with scores ranging from 0 (none correct) to 5 (perfect).
Immediately following the emotion identification
question, participants were asked to indicate their confidence on a 0 (not at all) to 100 (very high) scale, taken
directly from Beaupré and Hess (2006).
At the conclusion of the main task, participants
answered two self-report questions designed to
assess their motivation to affiliate with ingroup and
outgroup targets. The questions were, “I was motivated to identify the expressions of my ingroup[outgroup] members.” Participants responded on a 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scale. Question order was randomised.

Results
Motivation
Confirming the success of the ingroup manipulation,
participants reported greater motivation to identify
ingroup (M = 4.47, SD = 1.54) than outgroup (M =
3.76, SD = 1.53) expressions, t(44) = 3.24, p < .0012.

Confidence
To test our primary hypothesis, we submitted
responses to the question gauging confidence in
emotion identification to a 2 (group: ingroup, outgroup) × 5 (expression: anger, happiness, sadness,
disgust, fear) repeated-measures ANOVA. This analysis
revealed a main effect of emotion, F(1,41) = 20.10, p
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for confidence (left columns) and accuracy (right columns) for ingroup and outgroup expressions in
Experiment 1.
Confidence

Accuracy

Ingroup
Anger
Happiness
Sadness
Disgust
Fear

M
87.41
96.29
85.14
88.82
84.87

Outgroup
SD
9.61
6.84
12.45
7.70
11.11

M
84.36
94.72
83.69
88.75
83.82

Ingroup
SD
10.93
9.22
10.61
9.67
10.58

M
0.75
0.98
0.73
0.76
0.76

Outgroup
SD
0.23
0.06
0.14
0.18
0.21

M
0.67
0.99
0.58
0.71
0.84

SD
0.21
0.04
0.21
0.23
0.22

Note: Confidence scores ranged from 0 to 100 and accuracy scores represent proportion correct.

< .001, η 2 = .66, indicating a Happy Face Advantage
(Kirita & Endo, 1995). Most relevant to predictions,
the main effect of group was also significant, F(1,
44) = 5.47, p = .024, η 2 = .11, as participants felt more
confident when identifying ingroup (M = 88.50, SD =
7.08) than outgroup (M = 87.07, SD = 6.90) expressions.
Group membership did not interact with expression, F
(4, 41) = .60, p = .44, η 2 = .01 (see Table 1).

Accuracy
We submitted emotion identification scores to a 2
(group) × 5 (expression: anger, happiness, sadness,
disgust, fear) repeated-measured ANOVA. This analysis
revealed a significant main effect of expression, F(4, 41)
= 145.03, p < .001, η 2 = .93, corresponding to the
Happy Face Advantage in confidence. More importantly, the predicted main effect of group was also significant, F(1, 44) = 4.09, p = .049, η 2 = .085, with ingroup
expressions (M = 0.80, SD = 0.45) recognised more
accurately than outgroup expressions (M = 0.76, SD =
0.54), replicating previous results (Young & Hugenberg,
2010). This main effect of group was qualified by
expression, F(4, 41) = 4.79, p = .003, η 2 = .32 (see Table
1). Probing this interaction revealed an unexpected
reversal of the usual ingroup advantage for fearful
faces, as participants recognised fear more accurately
on outgroup than ingroup faces, t(44) = –2.36, p
= .023, d = .37. For all other expressions, emotion recognition was more accurate for ingroup than outgroup
faces, although this effect was only significant for
anger, t(44) = 1.56, p = .027, d = .28 and sadness, t(44)
= 4.08, p < .001, d = .81. In summary, although we did
observe the minimal ingroup advantage in identification, it varied in magnitude and reversed for fear
expressions.

each trial, we used sensitivity correlations. To do so,
for each participant, we calculated the point-biserial
correlation between the continuous confidence
measure and the binary accuracy measure, separately
for ingroup and outgroup trials. We then transformed
each correlation coefficient to a Fisher’s z-score. Comparing both ingroup and outgroup sensitivity correlations to 0, we see that trial-by-trial accuracy
correlations were positive for both ingroup (M = 0.48,
SD = 0.23, 95% CI [.41, .54]) and outgroup (M = 0.35,
SD = 0.30, 95% CI [.27, .44]) trials. Furthermore, mean
sensitivity correlations were significantly higher for
ingroup than outgroup trials, t(44) = 2.13, p = .04, d
= .32. As such, when measured on a trial-by-trial
basis, confidence on ingroup trials was a better predictor of accuracy than confidence on outgroup trials.

Discussion
Past research has revealed a cultural ingroup advantage in perceiver confidence when identifying
emotional displays (Beaupré & Hess, 2006). The
current research finds novel evidence that minimal
group distinctions created in the lab can create
similar ingroup biases in confidence, even when
culture is held constant. Specifically, the results
demonstrate that arbitrary intergroup boundaries
exert an influence on not just the accuracy of
emotion identification (cf. Young & Hugenberg,
2010), but also on participants’ subjective feelings of
confidence in identifying emotional displays, even
when perceiver and expresser are from the same
culture.

Experiment 2
Confidence and accuracy
To assess whether self-reported confidence in
emotion identification was related to accuracy on

Experiment 1 provides initial support for the notion
that arbitrary intergroup distinctions are sufficient to
generate ingroup advantages similar to those seen
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across cultural lines. However, the experiment used
faces displaying high intensity expressions which
may have inflated participants’ judgments of confidence and deflated error rates. The faces were also
identical to those used in Young and Hugenberg
(2010), leaving open the question of whether
minimal ingroup advantages generalise to other
stimuli. Lastly, the group motivation questions that
served as a manipulation check were face-valid and
straightforward but potentially demand-laden. With
these considerations in mind, we designed a second
experiment that closely replicates Experiment 1, but
with a different set of expressive faces and an alternative set of questions adapted from Van Bavel and Cunningham (2012) that measure group identification.

Cunningham, 2012), three each assessing identification with the ingroup and outgroup. Each question
was answered on 1–7 Likert scales. Ingroup or outgroup identification questions were grouped together
but which set were asked first was counterbalanced.

Method

Confidence

Participants

As in Experiment 1, participants’ responses to the
question assessing their emotion identification confidence were submitted to a 2 (group: ingroup, outgroup) × 5 (expression: anger, happiness, sadness,
disgust, fear) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was
a main effect of emotion, F(4, 32) = 4.082, p = .009,
η 2 = .34, with participants most confidently identifying
happiness (Kirita & Endo, 1995). Most relevant to predictions there was a main effect of group, F(1, 35) =
8.11, p = .007, η 2 = .19. Participants reported more
confidence when identifying ingroup (M = 87.70, SD
= 7.08) than outgroup (M = 85.07, SD = 6.90)
expressions. This main effect was not qualified by an
interaction with expression, F(1, 41) = .60, p = .44,
η 2 = .11 (see Table 2). Overall, the results for confidence are consistent with Experiment 1, suggesting
a generalised ingroup advantage that persists even
when a different set of expressive faces is used.

Thirty-eight participants of European Ancestry (23
female, Mage = 21.2) attending a public university in
the Northeastern United States took part in the experiment in exchange for partial course credit. Sample
size was determined based on the main effect of confidence in Experiment 1 (which is the primary measure
of interest) and desired power of .95. Data collection
was halted at the conclusion of the spring 2016 semester. Two participants misunderstood the confidence
task and were removed, leaving a final sample of 36.

Method and procedure
The minimal group induction and emotion decoding
and confidence rating task were identical to Experiment 1. However, expressive faces were selected
from the Warsaw Set of Emotional Facial Expression
Pictures (WSEFEP, see Olszanowski et al., 2015).
Importantly, this database includes intensity ratings
for each model and expression. This allowed us to
select expressions near the middle of the intensity
distribution, helping address a limitation of
Experiment 1. With this in mind, 10 White male
models1 were chosen who displayed anger, happiness, sadness, fear, and disgust with moderate
levels of intensity. These 10 faces were then randomly
split into 2 groups of 5, which were randomly presented as ingroup or outgroup faces as in Experiment
1. Which group of five served as ingroup and outgroup targets was counterbalanced.
After completion of the primary emotion confidence and identification task, participants answered
six self-report questions (adapted from Van Bavel &

Results
Motivation
The questions measuring identification with the
minimal ingroup and outgroup were both reliable (α
> .83 for both). As expected, participants reported
greater identification with the ingroup (M = 3.80, SD
= 1.07) than outgroup (M = 2.45, SD = 1.10), t(35) =
4.79, p < .0012.

Accuracy
Participants’ emotion identification scores were analysed with a 2 (group) × 5 (expression: anger, happiness, sadness, disgust, fear) repeated-measured
ANOVA. This analysis found a main effect of
expression, F(4, 32) = 11.75, p < .001, η 2 = .56, mirroring the Happy Face Advantage in confidence.
Notably, the predicted main effect of group was also
significant, F(1, 35) = 4.18, p = .048, η 2 = .11, with
ingroup expressions (M = 0.87, SD = 0.45) recognised
more accurately than outgroup expressions (M =
0.84, SD = 0.54). There was also no interaction
between group and expression, F(4, 32) = 1.84, p
= .125, η 2 = .22 (see Table 2). Unlike Experiment 1,
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations for confidence (left columns) and accuracy (right columns) for ingroup and outgroup expressions in
Experiment 2.
Confidence

Accuracy

Ingroup
Anger
Happiness
Sadness
Disgust
Fear

M
88.09
92.39
84.36
86.69
86.95

Outgroup
SD
12.01
14.43
16.91
11.76
12.90

M
85.63
88.37
85.19
85.10
82.82

Ingroup
SD
13.69
17.06
15.08
14.15
14.17

M
0.82
0.99
0.86
0.83
0.86

Outgroup
SD
0.23
0.05
0.18
0.20
0.20

M
0.77
0.92
0.88
0.76
0.87

SD
0.19
0.14
0.17
0.21
0.17

Note: Confidence scores ranged from 0 to 100 and accuracy scores represent proportion correct.

the ingroup advantage in identification was not qualified by expression.

Confidence and accuracy
We again assessed correlations between confidence
and accuracy on a trial-by-trial basis. For each participant, we calculated the point-biserial correlation
between the continuous confidence measure and
the binary accuracy measure, separately for ingroup
and outgroup trials. We then transformed each correlation coefficient to a Fisher’s z-score. Five of the 36
participants reported the same confidence level on
every trial of at least one group’s photos, rendering
it impossible to compute a sensitivity correlation. We
conducted the analysis on the remaining 31 participants. Comparing both ingroup and outgroup sensitivity correlations to 0, we see that trial-by-trial
accuracy correlations were positive for both ingroup
(M = 0.36, SD = 0.34, 95% CI [.24, .48]) and outgroup
(M = 0.28, SD = 0.24, 95% CI [.20, .36]) trials. Here,
mean sensitivity correlations were only descriptively
higher for ingroup than outgroup trials, t(30) = 1.32,
p = .20, d = .22.

Discussion
Experiment 2 supports the central findings in Experiment 1. With respect to the primary measure of interest, the minimal ingroup bias in confidence was
replicated using a different, and less intensely expressive set of faces. The minimal ingroup advantage in
identification replicated as well. Unlike Experiment 1,
however, there was no reversal of this effect for fear
expressions and the most notable ingroup advantage
was seen for happiness and sadness (instead of anger
and sadness). Once more, participants also reported
greater social interest in their newly found ingroup
than outgroup. As a manipulation check, this supports
the effectiveness of the manipulation. However,

variability on this measure did not moderate the confidence or accuracy findings.

General discussion
Past research has documented a cultural ingroup
advantage in emotion decoding confidence attributable to a lack of familiarity with cultural outgroup
expressive dialects (Beaupré & Hess, 2006). The
current work reports a similar effect in minimal intergroup contexts. These findings suggest that mere
intergroup distinctions affect perceiver confidence in
emotion identification even in contexts where
culture is held constant. This is a theoretically and
practically valuable finding. Emotional expressions
play a central role in coordinating social behaviours
(Parkinson, 2005). However, responding appropriately
to expressers requires not only accuracy in identifying
their emotions, but confidence in doing so (Beaupré &
Hess, 2006). Without confidence, the appropriate
behavioural reactions to emotional displays (e.g.
Marsh et al., 2005) may be inhibited as the perceiver
seeks to confirm the correct interpretation of the
expression. More generally, intergroup interactions
are fraught with anxiety and discomfort (e.g.
Stephan, 2014), and a lack of confidence when decoding outgroup emotional displays likely contributes to
these uneasy interactions (e.g. Gray et al., 2008).
These results are conceptually in line with other
demonstrations of relatively trivial intergroup boundaries creating ingroup favouring biases in emotion
identification (e.g. Thibault et al., 2006; Young &
Hugenberg, 2010) That said, while providing evidence
for a social-cognitive perspective, our findings do not
suggest that cultural effects in emotion identification
can be entirely reduced to more generic ingroup/outgroup effects, as dialect theory is well supported (e.g.
Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Instead, we suggest that
ingroup favouring biases in emotion decoding
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confidence and accuracy stem from a multitude of coacting factors, including both greater familiarity with
ingroup expressive norms and dialects (e.g. Elfenbein,
Beaupré, Lévesque, & Hess, 2007) and greater baseline
motivation to attend to and process ingroup
emotional signals (e.g. Stevenson, Soto, & Adams,
2012; Young & Hugenberg, 2010). The current results
show that even when controlling for former, the
latter is sufficient to bring about an ingroup advantage
in confidence.

Additional findings
Beyond confirming the minimal ingroup advantage in
emotion recognition and finding novel evidence for
an ingroup advantage in confidence, we observed
several additional interesting patterns. First, we
found evidence that confidence ratings and accuracy
were correlated, with this effect being significantly
stronger for ingroup than outgroup expressions in
Experiment 1 and descriptively so in Experiment
2. Although Beaupré and Hess (2006) did not find correlations between aggregate cultural ingroup advantages in accuracy and confidence in either of their
studies, other research finds that analysing trial-bytrial judgments of emotion identification accuracy in
the manner reported here predicts performance
(Kelly & Metcalfe, 2011). Additionally, the relation
between accuracy and confidence found in the
current data fits nicely with recent evidence showing
that participants are aware of their superior performance when processing ingroup compared to outgroup
faces in a memory paradigm (Hourihan, Benjamin, &
Liu, 2012). One possibility for this metacognitive
awareness is that perceivers are motivated to devote
more attentional resources to ingroup than outgroup
faces (e.g. Zhou, Pu, Young, & Tse, 2014) and correctly
infer that their greater attention translates to greater
accuracy. That said, in light of the merely descriptive
trend observed in Experiment 2, future work is
needed to determine whether the greater ingroup
confidence–accuracy correlation is robust.
Although accuracy was not the primary measure of
interest, some unexpected findings emerged here,
including superior identification of outgroup fear
expressions in Experiment 1. However, this outgroup
fear effect was not found in past research (e.g. Young
& Hugenberg, 2010) and did not replicate in Experiment 2. Future research is necessary to identify
whether this pattern is replicable and if so, what mechanism causes the effect. Moreover, the primary focus of

the current paper was testing a minimal ingroup
advantage in confidence, and this critical effect was
not qualified by expression in either experiment.
Lastly, although participants self-reported greater
motivation (Experiment 1) and identification (Experiment 2) with the ingroup, exploratory analyses including these measures as continuous predictors found
that they did not moderate ingroup advantages in
decoding confidence or accuracy.2 Past research has
found that similar explicit measures of ingroup motivation and identification moderate ingroup advantages
in emotion identification (Stevenson et al., 2012) and
memory (Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012). However,
these experiments differed in several important ways
(e.g. testing identification of complex emotions or
face memory) that may explain the discrepancy. It
also may be the case that these motivation measures
are not sensitive enough to reliably predict individual
differences in the dependent variables of interest.
Future work with motivation as a central objective
may best measure motivation or group identification
in different ways, including implicit measures or with
alternative self-report items (e.g. inclusion-of-group
in the self, see Thibault et al., 2006), and with a
higher powered sample that is more appropriate for
capturing individual differences.

Conclusion
Overall, the current findings provide novel support for
a minimal ingroup advantage in emotion identification confidence. These findings underscore how
perceiver confidence, a critical aspect of emotion
decoding, is sensitive to arbitrary group boundaries
and can emerge even when expresser and perceiver
are from the same cultural and racial group. In broad
terms, the current work adds to a growing body of evidence (e.g. Hugenberg et al., 2011) that social-cognitive factors contribute to biases in face perception,
even when factors like culture, race, and intergroup
contact are held constant.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes
1. Using the file names provided by Olszanowski et al.
(2015), we used the following models: AG, HW, JG, KA,
KM, MG, MK, MR2, PA, and PB.
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2. Follow-up analyses including these motivation scores as
continuous predictors found no significant relation
between self-reported motivation and ingroup advantages in confidence or accuracy in either Experiment 1
or 2.

References
Beaupré, M. G., & Hess, U. (2006). An ingroup advantage for confidence in emotion recognition judgments: The moderating
effect of familiarity with the expressions of outgroup
members. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 16–26.
Darwin, C. (1965). The expression of emotions in man and animals.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1872).
Ekman, P. (1972). Universals and cultural differences in facial
expressions of emotion. In J. Cole (Ed.), Nebraska symposium
on motivation, 1971 (Vol. 19, pp. 207–283). Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press.
Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2002). On the universality and cultural specificity of emotion recognition: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 128, 203–235.
Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2003). When familiarity breeds
accuracy: Cultural exposure and facial emotion recognition.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 276–290.
Elfenbein, H. A., Beaupré, M. G., Lévesque, M. & Hess, U. (2007).
Toward a dialect theory: Cultural differences in the expression
and recognition of posed facial expressions. Emotion, 7, 131–146.
Gray, H. M., Mendes, W. B., & Denny-Brown, C. (2008). An in-group
advantage in detecting intergroup anxiety. Psychological
Science, 19, 1233–1237.
Hess, U., & Thibault, P. (2009). Darwin and emotion expression.
American Psychologist, 64, 120–128.
Hugenberg, K., Young, S. G., Sacco, D. F., & Bernstein, M. J. (2011).
Social cognitive influences on the processing of emotion and
identity recognition. In A. J. Calder, G. Rhodes, J. V. Haxby, & M.
H. Johnson, (Eds.), The handbook of face perception (pp. 245–
261). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hourihan, K. L., Benjamin, A. S., & Liu, X. (2012). A cross-race effect
in metamemory: Predictions of face recognition are more
accurate for members of our own race. Journal of Applied
Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 158–162.
Kelly, K. J., & Metcalfe, J. (2011). Metacognition of emotional face
recognition. Emotion, 11, 896–906.

199

Kirita, T., & Endo, M. (1995). Happy face advantage in recognizing
facial expressions. Acta Psychologica, 89, 149–163.
Marsh, A. A., Ambady, N., & Kleck, R. E. (2005). The effects of fear
and anger facial expressions on approach- and avoidancerelated behaviors. Emotion, 5, 119–124.
Marsh, A. A., Elfenbein, H. A., & Ambady, N. (2003). Nonverbal
“accents”: cultural differences in facial expressions of
emotion. Psychological Science, 14, 373–376.
Marsh, A. A., Kozak, M. N., & Ambady, N. (2007). Accurate identification of fear facial expressions predicts prosocial behavior.
Emotion, 7, 239–251.
Murphy, K. R., Myors, B., & Wolach, A. (2004). Statistical power
analysis: 2. Aufl. Mahwah: Earlbaum.
Olszanowski, M., Pochwatko, G., Kukliński, K., Ścibor-Rylski, M.,
Lewinski, P., Ohme, R. (2015). Warsaw set of emotional facial
expression pictures: A validation study of facial display photographs. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1516. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.01516
Parkinson, B. (2005). Do facial movements express emotions or
communicate motives. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 9, 278–311.
Stephan, W. G. (2014). Intergroup anxiety theory, research, and
practice. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18, 239–
255.
Stevenson, M.T., Soto, J. A., & Adams, R. B., Jr. (2012). More than
meets the eye: The role of self-identity in reasoning about
the emotional states of others. Emotion, 12, 882–886.
Thibault, P., Bourgeois, P., & Hess, U. (2006). The effect of groupidentification on emotion recognition: The case of cats and
basketball players. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
42, 676–683.
Tottenham, N., Tanaka, J., Leon, A. C., McCarry, T., Nurse, M., Hare,
T. A., … Nelson, C. A. (2009). The NimStim set of facial
expressions: Judgments from untrained research participants.
Psychiatry Research, 168, 242–249.
Van Bavel, J. J., & Cunningham, W. A. (2012). A social identity
approach to person memory: Group membership, collective
identification, and social role shape attention and memory.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38, 1566–1578.
Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2010). Mere social categorization
modulates identification of facial expressions of emotion.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 964–977.
Zhou, G., Pu, X., Young, S. G., & Tse, C. S. (2014). Effects of divided
attention and social categorization on the Own-race bias in
face recognition. Visual Cognition, 22, 1296–1310.

Copyright of Cognition & Emotion is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright
holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.

